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RECONSIDERING THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
FOR A RIGHT OF SECURITY
Donald L. Beschle*
INTRODUCTION

For decades, the issue of gun control has sparked heated debate.
Argument has become more intense in the past few years as communities have considered various restrictions on access to or use of firearms.
In a handful of cases, localities have enacted unprecedented total or
near total bans on the private ownership of handguns.' Debate in the
legislative arena has focused on the benefits sought by gun-control proponents, the likelihood of achieving such benefits from specific gun-control proposals, and the social costs of limiting the average citizen's access to firearms. 2 At the same time, increasing interest in the policy
questions of gun control has renewed interest in the legal questions concerning the constitutional validity of firearms legislation.
The most prominent of these legal questions is the effect of the
second amendment to the United States Constitution on firearms legislation. The second amendment provides: "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." Interpretations of this
provision and its effect generally have taken one of two radically-opposite positions. The dominant view, put forth with almost complete unanimity by twentieth-century courts, has focused on the first half of the
provision and its reference to a "well regulated militia." The amendment, courts hold, guards only against federal attempts to disarm or
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; L.L.M., Temple University
School of Law; J.D., New York University School of Law; B.A., Fordham University.
I. E.g. Morton Grove, Ill., Ordinance 81-I1, reprinted in Quilici v. Village of Morton
Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 263 n.l (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 194 (1983).
2. The literature on the policy questions posed by gun control legislation is extensive and, as
might be expected, does not achieve a consensus for or against such proposals. Pro-gun control

advocates probably most often cite G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING,
AMERICAN LIFE (1969).

FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN

For a collection of arguments that gun control would be unwise, unnecessary, and ineffective,

see, e.g.,
3.

FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE

(D. Kates ed. 1984).

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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abolish organized state militias. Under this interpretation, the second
amendment is irrelevant to the debate surrounding federal, state, and
local gun-control proposals because such proposals seek only to restrict
the individual's access to firearms and do not affect organized state
militias.
While it has found almost no judicial support, academic critics of
the prevalent judicial interpretation have put forth an opposing view of
the second amendment. Drawing on attitudes expressed in eighteenthcentury American and earlier English thought, these commentators
have concluded that the "right to keep and bear arms" is constitutionally equal in strength and importance to any other provision in the Bill
of Rights. Proponents of this minority viewpoint maintain that the "militia" clause never was meant as a restriction and therefore the rights
guaranteed by the second amendment are guaranteed to individuals,
not merely to states.' Under this interpretation, the second amendment
would stand as a serious barrier to the federal, state, or local enactment
of much proposed firearms legislation.
It is obvious that the dominant judicial attitude toward the second
amendment and the minority views of the prominent academic critics
of that attitude are irreconcilable. Close examination of the issue, however, discloses that neither the majority nor the minority viewpoint is
wholly adequate. The prevalent judicial view, although correct in most
of its conclusions regarding the constitutionality of firearms legislation,
has ignored the arguments of its critics, and in doing so has failed to
provide a satisfying explanation of what the second amendment does
mean. While it may be true that the provision no longer has the same
practical importance today as it did when it was adopted, the courts
should give a more convincing rationale for their rulings than the mere
citation of past authority which itself lacked comprehensive analysis.
At the same time, the critics of the prevalent judicial attitude toward the second amendment have put forth a position at least as unsatisfying as that which they attack. The critics ignore the effect of two
hundred years of history on society and on constitutional doctrine by
focusing almost exclusively on eighteenth-century attitudes and arguing
for their adoption in almost every detail in the twentieth century. They
also fail to consider the ways in which changes in the world have altered the relationships between ends sought by the Constitution and the
types of means which might be effective or necessary to achieve those
4.
5.

See infra notes 12-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
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ends. The inadequacy of the critics' position becomes most obvious
when they attempt to explain just what restrictions on weapons are
constitutionally permissible. Even the critics tend to concede that some
restrictions are constitutionally permitted at least for some sorts of
weapons. 6 However, eighteenth-century attitudes provide little assistance in the process of twentieth-century line-drawing and the proposed
rules which emerge, such as the proposal that government may not restrain tho ownership of any type of weapon in use in 1787, or any "lineal descendant" of such a weapon, 7 lack any reasonable rationale and
essentially are worthless. Blind adherence to every detail of the Framers' thoughts does not present an adequate analytical framework for
the constitutional gun-control issue.
The flaw with both of the conflicting positions on this issue is the
apparent assumption that the ultimate concern of the second amendment is with the weapons themselves. In fact, both the language of the
amendment itself and the history behind it clearly indicate that the
goal sought by the second amendment is the security of the people.
Once it is recognized that security is the essential concern of the second
amendment and that firearms or other weapons are only a means to
that end, the analysis will yield more satisfactory results.
Viewing firearms as merely a means of insuring personal security
rather than as ends in themselves leads to a conclusion somewhere between the prevailing judicial view that the amendment does not guarantee individual rights and the view of the critics that the private ownership of most firearms should not be prohibited. Stated simply, the
second amendment should not be seen as a barrier to state and local
regulation of gun ownership, including such drastic measures as a total
prohibition on the private possession of firearms. On the other hand,
the amendment should bar the prohibition or serious restriction by the
federal government of the right to own certain weapons, which are ap6. See, e.g., Kates, Handgun Prohibitionand the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1983), in which one of the most prominent advocates of a strong
personal right to bear arms under the second amendment contends that the constitutional protection of the provision extends only to weapons which are "(1) 'of the kind in common use' among
law-abiding people today; (2) useful and appropriate not just for military purposes, but also for
law enforcement and individual self-defense, and (3) lineally descended from the kinds of weaponry known to the Founders." Id. at 259. He also concedes that at least certain types of registration schemes (as opposed to confiscation or prohibition) are constitutional, even with respect to
protected weapons. Id. at 264-66.
7. See id. at 259-64. On the other hand, Kates' requirements that the weapon be of the kind
in common use among law-abiding people today and useful for law enforcement and self-defense
purposes can be justified on grounds other than mere historicism. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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propriate for self-defense or defense of the home against intruders. This
intermediate position may please neither side of the gun-control debate,
but it is consistent with the underlying policies behind the second
amendment as they apply to the realities of twentieth-century
America.'
I.

CONTRASTING VIEWS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

A. Minimizing the Amendment: The Prevailing Judicial View
Case law involving second amendment challenges to federal and
state gun-control legislation consistently has rejected those constitutional claims. Almost without exception, courts have held that the
amendment is a limitation only on the federal government and therefore is irrelevant in assessing the validity of state or local legislation.9
Even as applied to federal action, the amendment guarantees only that
the states retain the right of self-defense through the maintenance of
the militia and therefore provides no individual right to keep or bear
10
arms.
The Supreme Court has spoken on the subject of the second
amendment only four times.11 In 1876, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Cruikshank 2 reversed a criminal conviction of southern
whites charged, among other things, with conspiring to deprive blacks
of an alleged constitutional right to keep and bear arms. 13 The Court
based its reversal upon the conclusion that the second amendment conferred no such right upon individuals, but rather was meant only to
limit the power of the federal government in its relations with the
8. The debate over gun control has been waged "at a level of propaganda more appropriate
to social warfare than to democratic discourse." Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War,
THE PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1976, at 37. Even in law journals, the impression often is that constitutional conclusions are used simply to bolster the policy conclusions of the author. Compare Jackson, Handgun Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 189 (1977)
(favoring controls and finding them constitutional), with McClure, Firearms and Federalism, 7
IDAHO L. REV. 197 (1970) (opposing controls and finding them unconstitutional).
9. See infra notes 12-40 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252
(1886); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
The first three of the four decisions occurred over ninety years ago, prior to the development
of most contemporary constitutional doctrine. See 92 U.S. 542; 116 U.S. 252; 153 U.S. 535.
12. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
13. There were thirty-two counts to the indictment, some repetitive, and only two dealt
specifically with the right to bear arms. Id. at 544-45. Counts based upon interference with the
right of assembly, the right of due process, the right of equal protection, the right to vote, and
other charges all were dismissed for various reasons. Id. at 548-59.
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states.14 The second amendment established only a collective right, exercised through the maintenance of a militia. 15
Ten years later, in Presser v. Illinois," the Court upheld the defendant's conviction for violating a state law which prohibited military
assemblies held without a permit. With little discussion beyond a citation to Cruikshank, the Court held that not only did the second amendment establish no individual right to bear arms, but that it also did not
apply at all to actions of state governments." Similarly, in 1894 the
Court in Miller v. Texas18 held that the amendment applied only to the
federal government and consequently upheld the defendant's murder
conviction despite his contention that the crime of illegally carrying a
gun for which he initially had been apprehended was unconstitutional
under the second amendment.1 9
Although these early cases still are considered good law and are
cited favorably,2 0 they must be viewed in light of the fact that they
were decided prior to the twentieth-century expansion of much of the
Bill of Rights to include action by the states. In Miller v. Texas, for
example, the Court also held the fourth amendment provisions against
unreasonable searches and seizures inapplicable to the states.2 The
fourth amendment subsequently has been incorporated into the due
22
process clause and applied to the states despite this early precedent;
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 553.
See id.
116 U.S. 252 (1886).

17. Id. at 265. Again, the second amendment discussion is brief. Most of the opinion deals
with the defendant's contention that the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutional either because it conflicted with federal statutes or because it impermissibly intruded on the
federal interest in having all citizens armed and well-trained for possible federal military service.
Id. at 260-69.
18.

153 U.S. 535 (1894).

19. Id. at 538. By 1894, the Court said the rule that the second amendment did not apply to
the states was "well settled." Id.
20. See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 194 (1983) (citing Presser); Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n v. Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 210 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (citing Cruikshank).
21. 153 U.S. at 538. Likewise, the Court in Cruikshank disposed of non-firearms-related
constitutional claims for reasons courts today clearly would not follow. See 92 U.S. at 548-59. For
example, the Court held that the first amendment rights of speech and assembly were not applicable to the states, id. at 552, and that the federal government was powerless to prohibit crimes
committed within a single state that did not directly affect a federal interest clearly enumerated in
the Constitution. Id. at 553-54. The first amendment, of course, has been applied to the states for
over fifty years, see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
679 (1931), and federal jurisdiction over "local" crimes has been greatly expanded. See, e.g.,
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
22. The substance of the fourth amendment was applied to the states in Wolf v. Colorado,
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the failure of the second amendment to be accorded similar treatment
must be explained for more substantial reasons than mere stare decisis.
The only twentieth-century Supreme Court case construing the
second amendment is United States v. Miller.23 In Miller, the defend-

ant was indicted for transporting a sawed-off shotgun in interstate commerce in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934.4 The district
court quashed the indictment on constitutional grounds, holding that
the provisions of the Act on which the indictment was based violated
the second amendment. 25 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the amendment did not apply to a weapon, such as a sawed-off shot-

gun, which lacked a "reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia." 26 The Miller Court examined the
history of the amendment and concluded that its "obvious purpose"

was "to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness"
of state militias. 27 Even against action by the federal government, the
second amendment will protect individual rights, if at all, only to the

extent that they are related to the states' right to maintain their
militias.28
Although the Supreme Court decisions in this area are sparse, the
Court's holdings are clear and lower federal courts consistently have
followed the principles set forth in these cases to hold that: (a) the
second amendment is not a limitation on the states and is therefore
irrelevant to discussions of the constitutionality of state laws or local
ordinances, 29 and (b) as against the federal government, the amend338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Court applied the more controversial exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). The only provisions of the first eight amendments that have not been applied
to the states are the second amendment, the fifth amendment clause requiring a grand jury indictment in all criminal prosecutions, and the seventh amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases.
See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 413 (1983).
23. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
24. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236-40 (current version at 26 U.S.C. §§
5801-71 (1976 ed.)) The 1934 act, largely a response to the well-publicized "gangster era" violence of organized crime, "curtailed civilian ownership of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, silencers, and other forms of 'gangster-type' weapons." J. WRIGHT, P. Rossi & K. DALY, UNDER
THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 245 (1983).
25. 26 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Ark. 1939).
26. 307 U.S. at 178. The Court's conclusion that a shotgun was not an appropriate militia
weapon was based on the absence of any evidence to that effect; it was not something that could
be judicially-noticed. Id. It has been argued that this holding leads to the inevitable conclusion
that the federal government "cannot regulate the right to keep and bear arms suitable for militia
use." S. HAIBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 165 (1984). At best, however, this is merely
an inference with respect to a question not before the Miller Court.
27. 307 U.S. at 178.
28. Id. at 178-79.
29. See, e.g., Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261; Cases v. United States, 131 F,2d 916 (1st Cir.
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ment protects only the collective right of the state to organize and
maintain a militia and does not guarantee any rights to individuals

apart from that collective right."0 In short, it appears that the only possible violation of the second amendment would be a federal attempt to

disarm organized state militias, an action which is highly unlikely and
completely irrelevant to the types of firearms regulations actually under

discussion at the federal, state, or local levels. It therefore is not surprising that lower federal courts, without exception, have rejected individuals' second amendment claims. Indeed, the courts' disposition of
the claims generally warrants only one paragraph, or less, of
comment.31
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove"2 is a rare example of a case in

which a federal court, while adhering to established second-amendment
principles, did comment at some length upon the: plaintiffs' constitutional claim. Morton Grove also is significant in that unlike most prior
gun-control cases that dealt with licensing schemes or other legislative

efforts to partially restrict firearms possession, it involved an ordinance
which almost completely prohibited handgun ownership within the village.3 3 Handgun owners in Morton Grove brought suit challenging the

constitutionality of the ordinance, and both the district court 3 ' and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 3 rejected their claims.
The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument that Presser
was no longer good law as nothing more than plaintiffs' "own opinions"
and reaffirmed the principle that the second amendment does not apply
to the states. 36 Although this rationale would be sufficient in itself to
1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 889 (1945); Engblom v. Carey,
522 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948
(1976); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971); Vietnamese Fisherman's Ass'n,
543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); Eckert v. City of
Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973); United States v. Tomlin,
454 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1972).
32. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 194 (1983).
33. See id. at 263 n.l. The exceptions in the ordinance apply to police officers, prison personnel, members of the armed services, private security guards, authorized state employees, licensed gun clubs, licensed gun collectors, and owners of antique firearms.
34. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. III. 1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d
261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 194 (1983).
The district court's rejection of the plaintiff's second amendment claims, although based principally on binding precedent, is set forth at greater length than the, usual lower federal court
treatment of such claims. Id. at 1180-83.
35. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 194 (1983).
36. Id. at 270.
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dispose of the second amendment claim, the court "[flor the sake of
completeness" commented on the scope of the amendment.3 7 The
"plain meaning" of the amendment, as well as precedent, make it

"clear that the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the pres-

ervation of a militia." 8 Any private possession of arms not necessary
for such militia functions, therefore, is unprotected by the Constitu-

tion.39 In light of this, plaintiffs' historical discussions of the importance of individual arms at English common law and at the time of the
0
drafting of the Constitution were held to be irrelevant.4

Judge Coffey, in his dissent, became the first federal judge to articulate a position contrary to the prevailing judicial view that the right
to bear arms is not an individual right. While most of his opinion dealt
with issues of state constitutional law,'4 1 he went on to state that "the

right to possess commonly owned arms for self-defense" is a "basic
human freedom" entitled to constitutional protection.' 2 Interference

with that right, at least interference as drastic as a total ban on the
possession of such weapons, was in Judge Coffey's opinion a violation of

the Constitution. Interestingly enough, the dissent does not rely explicitly on the second amendment, but cites the fourth and fifth amend-

ments and the privacy rights which emanate from those provisions.' 3
Although the state clearly may restrict possession of firearms outside
the home, an absolute ban on possession, including possession within
one's home, is an impermissible intrusion on a protected zone of privacy." Judge Coffey's dissent remains, however, the sole statement by
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 269-71.
40. Id. at 270 n.8.
41. Id. at 271-78 (Coffey, J., dissenting). The state constitutional issues were whether the
ordinances violated the state constitutional right to bear arms provision; whether the village exceeded its home rule powers by legislating on a matter of statewide, rather than local, concern;
and whether the ordinance was preempted by statewide regulation of handguns. Id. at 271.
With respect to the state-created right to bear arms, the majority held that legislative history,
along with the constitutional language making the right "subject to the police power," led to the
conclusion that only a total ban on all types of firearms would infringe upon the right. Since the
statute did not extend to all types of firearms, it was valid. Id. at 265-67.
42. Id. at 278 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 279-80.
44. Id. at 278-80.
A fundamental part of our concept of ordered liberty is the right to protect one's home
and family against dangerous intrusions subject to the criminal law. Morton Grove,
acting like the omniscient and paternalistic "Big Brother" in George Orwell's novel,
"1984," cannot, in the name of public welfare, dictate to its residents that they may not
possess a handgun in the privacy of their home. To so prohibit the possession of handguns in the privacy of the home prevents a person from protecting his home and family,

HeinOnline -- 9 Hamline L. Rev. 76 1986

SECOND AMENDMENT

a federal judge supporting an individual right to possess and own firearms. The Supreme Court's refusal to review the court of appeals' decision in Morton Grove leaves the orthodox judicial view of the second

amendment intact.
Several state courts in the nineteenth century had decided that the
second amendment established an individual right to bear arms, "5 but
after the Supreme Court rejected the individual rights contention and
also declined to apply the amendment to the states a majority of those
courts later held that the Constitution did not create such a right." A
few state courts, while reaching the same conclusions as those adopted

by federal courts, have gone beyond citation of precedent to justify
those conclusions. In Commonwealth v. Davis, 47 for example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts examined the history of the
amendment and determined that it was created largely as a response to
fears of a strong federal standing army. Rather than outlaw the existence of such an army, the amendment sought to assure the continued

existence of strong state militias as counterweights to federal power.
The second amendment therefore could not limit the states if they
chose to limit the individual possession of weapons, since the amendment's purpose was to protect the states against federal encroach-

ment. 8 This same line of reasoning led the New Jersey Supreme Court
to hold, in Burton v. Sills, 4 9 that the second amendment will not be

applied to the states through incorporation into the due process clause
despite the twentieth-century trend toward extending Bill of Rights
guarantees to state and local government action. 50
endangers law-abiding citizens and renders meaningless the Supreme Court's teaching
that "a man's home is his castle."
Id. at 280.
45. E.g., Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846). Apparently the only successful state court second amendment claim in the twentieth century was In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609 (1902).
46. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 83 Nev. 404, 432 P.2d 929 (1967); Application of Cassidy,
268 A.D. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944), af'd, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947); Photos v. City
of Toledo, 19 Misc. 147, 250 N.E.2d 916 (1969).
47. 343 N.E.2d 847, 369 Mass. 886 (1976).
48. [The second amendment] was adopted to quiet the fears of those who thought that
the Congressional powers under article 1,§ 8, clauses 15 and 16, with regard to the
State militias might have the effect of enervating or destroying those forces. The
amendment is to be read as an assurance that the national government shall not so
reduce the militias.
Id. at 850 (footnote omitted).
49. 53 N.J. 86, 248 A.2d 521 (1968).
50. The court stated:
The plaintiffs venture the prediction that, notwithstanding all of the foregoing, the
Supreme Court will hereafter "extend the restrictions of the Second Amendment to all
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In contrast to the federal courts' unanimous rejection of individual-rights claims, however, an occasional state court opinion would indicate, at least in dicta, that some types of firearms restrictions, such as
a total ban on the individual possession of weapons, might be extreme
enough to violate the second amendment. 1 Regardless, the state courts'
analysis of the issue has added little to the principles enunciated by the
federal courts.
State courts also have rejected most claims that legislation restricting the possession of firearms violates state constitutional provisions,0 2 although an occasional state court has held that a state constitution provides guarantees against interference with individual gun
ownership. 8 But while state constitutions may be important in determining the validity of state and local firearms regulations, they are of
little or no relevance in determining the scope of the federal guarantee.
Case law, at least for the last century, has been nearly unanimous
in holding that the purpose of the initial clause of the second amendment is to protect the right of states to organize and maintain their
militias. It follows logically that the amendment does not apply to the
states and therefore has no effect on state or local firearms restrictions,
and that the amendment restricts the federal government only insofar
as the federal government attempts to interfere with the organizing and
arming of state militias. Since the current controversy over gun-control
legislation concerns only restrictions on individuals and not on state militias, the second amendment is inapplicable to these restrictions under
the currently-accepted doctrine.
B. Maximizing the Amendment: The Critical Commentators' Views
Although case law offers almost no support for the effective use of
the second amendment to protect an individual right -to possess firearms, several commentators have sharply criticized the judicial view.
of the States" as it has done with some other amendments in the Bill of Rights. Enough
has been said to differentiate the second amendment from those which protect individual rights and, as such, have been carried over into the fourteenth amendment.
248 A.2d at 528.
51. E.g., State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 159 S.E.2d 1 (1968). While upholding a conviction for breaking and entering, the court noted that the constitution assumed the existence of a
right to possess weapons for use in self-defense. 159 S.E.2d at 11.
52. Dowlut & Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA.
L. REV. 177, 186-91 (1982). This article contains the most extensive collection and discussion of
cases analyzing various state constitutional provisions securing a right to bear arms.
53. See, e.g., State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P.2d 94 (1980); Schubert v. DeBard, 398
N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. App. 1980).
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These critics rely primarily on history, both of the time of the drafting

of the Constitution and of earlier English common law, to support their
argument that the Framers recognized and valued the right of the individual to bear arms and meant to preserve the right through the second
amendment. While the courts view the second amendment as irrelevant
to the modern-day balance between individual rights and government

power, their critics find the provision absolutely essential to the constitutional scheme.
Commentators have traced the debate about armed citizens as far

back as ancient Greece. In their view, the dispute arises from the conflict between the "libertarian" position which favors the wide ownership
of weapons and the "authoritarian" position which centralizes the
means of force in government institutions to keep the people "helpless

and obedient." 5 For example, Aristotle criticized the exclusive possession of arms by a class of professional soldiers as leading inevitably to
the dominance of that class over unarmed citizens. 5 He believed that
all citizens should possess and bear arms as a check on the tyranny

which threatens the community from within and without.56 In contrast,
the more authoritarian Plato suggested that individuals may possess
arms only with the permission of the state,5' although he did favor

mandatory military training for all citizens. 8
The commentators contend that Cicero's promotion of the right of
self-defense and the right of the people to protect the Roman republic
54. S. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 8-14 (1984). This book contains an extensive historical treatment of the subject, with the author concluding that the second amendment
does create an individual right to bear arms. Some other works reach the same conclusion. See,
e.g., Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983). However, other writers do not agree that there is such an
individual right. See, e.g., Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An HistoricalAnalysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1975); Rohner, The Right to Bear
Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 53 (1966).
55. See HALBROOK, supra note 54, at 11-14. Halbrook quotes from two of Aristotle's
works, Politics and the Athenian Constitution. Of course, not everyone would agree with the characterization of Aristotle as a spokesman for libertarianism. Karl Popper classifies Aristotle, along
with Plato, as among the enemies of the open society. See M. HAMBURGER, MORALS AND LAW:
THE GROWTH OF ARISTOTLE'S LEGAL THEORY Xi (1970). It does seem clear, however, that Aristotle at least was less authoritarian than Plato and more influential on Enlightenment thinkers and
constitutionalists. Id.
56. HALBROOK, supra note 54, at 13.

57.

Id. at 10-11.

58. Id. at 10-1I. Halbrook draws from two of Plato's works, Republic and Laws. Few scholars would challenge the characterization of Plato's thought as authoritarian. "It is true that in
[Plato's concept of the state] there are rights, just as there are duties, but they can hardly be said
to belong in any particular sense to individuals. They are inherent rather in the services or func-

tions that individuals perform." G. SABINE, A
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against tyranny required that the people possess arms.59 Later thinkers,
including Machiavelli, Algernon Sydney, and John Locke preferred the

wide dispersion of arms instead of limiting them to a standing army as
the best means of protecting against foreign invasion and domestic tyr-

anny and assisting the right of self-defense. 0 The work of these philosophers was far more influential on the Framers of the Constitution than
that of opponents of popular rule, such as Jean Bodin, who would prohibit members of the non-ruling class from possessing or bearing
arms. 61
English common law prior to the American Revolution generally
recognized not only a right but a duty of citizens to maintain arms.
With England having no standing army until late in the seventeenth
century and no regular police force until the nineteenth century, all
able-bodied males were expected to be available for both military and
temporary police duties. They also were expected to provide their own

weapons for these tasks."' Significantly, exceptions to this combined
right and duty to bear arms were made for persons viewed as potential

opponents of the state, such as those remaining Catholic after the English Protestant Reformation. Catholics could keep weapons appropriate only for self-defense, and even these could be taken away in times

of civil strife.63 Similarly, Charles II, insecure after the restoration of

monarchy following the rule of Oliver Cromwell, proclaimed new re-

strictions on the private manufacture and possession of arms." This led
to the provision in the English Bill of Rights of 1689: "That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defenses suitable
to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law." 6
59. See id. at 15-17. Halbrook cites to two volumes of Cicero, Murder Trials and Selected
Political Speeches.
60. Id. at 7, 20-32. To one only superficially familiar with the history of political philosophy, the citation of Machiavelli, author of The Prince which is an amoral presentation of how to
exercise royal power most effectively, may seem strange. But Machiavelli's other works, particularly Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, seem to indicate that The Prince was
meant at most as a practical guide to conducting the type of government then prevalent in Italy,
and that Machiavelli's "genuine enthusiasm" was for popular government. See SABINE, supra note
58, at 338-52. Such divergent thinkers as Thomas Hobbes and the republican constitutionalist
James Harrington admired various parts of Machiavelli's works. Id.
61. HALBROOK, supra note 54, at 24-26. For a brief outline of the thought of this influential
defender of the absolute authority of the sovereign, see SABINE, supra note 58, at 399-414.
62. Malcolm, supra note 54, at 290-92.
63. Id. at 293.
64. Id. at 295-302. In Malcolm's estimation, it was these efforts by Charles I1which shifted
the thinking of Englishmen from regarding the keeping of arms as essentially a duty to essentially
a right. Id. at 294-95.
65. Id. at 305-07.
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The critical commentators see evidence in this common law history
that supports the essential link between freedom and the individual possession of arms. The denial of the right to bear arms to those individuals perceived as a threat to the state was itself a sign of second-class
citizenship. The commentators also point to the English Bill of Rights

as evidence that the English and eighteenth-century Americans considered the right to bear arms to be recognized by positive law and not
merely as a normative view of philosophers." However, the qualifying

phrases of the Bill of Rights provision make it clear that any recognition of an individual right to bear arms was not absolute. Although
mere possession of standard weapons never was made a criminal offense,' 7 subsequent statutes restricted the use of firearms and prohibited some devices that were seen as having no legitimate uses. At the

same time, it is not entirely clear that Parliament could not have
criminalized such possession if it so desired. The Bill of Rights clearly
prohibited disarming the public through royal fiat, but the final clause
of the arms provision is ambiguous about whether Parliament could do
SO.

68

The Framers of the United States Constitution clearly were famil-

iar with the thought of political philosophers from Aristotle to Locke, 69
and had a background in English political and legal history. In addi-

tion, it was an army of self-armed militiamen that defeated the suppos66. See HALBROOK, supra note 54, at 43-48.
67. In 1689, Parliament enacted "An act for the better securing the government by disarming papists and reputed papists," 1 W. & M., ch. 15 (1689), prohibiting Catholics from keeping
arms except those necessary for self-defense. In 1692, Parliament enacted "An act for the more
easie discovery and conviction of such as shall destroy the game of this kingdom," 4 & 5 W. &
M., ch. 23 (1692), which limited the types of weapons which could be kept by those unqualified to
hunt. See Malcolm, supra note 54, at 308-09.
In addition to these subsequent statutes, the language in the Bill of Rights provision can be
interpreted to include prior existing statutes as exceptions to the right. Id. at 308. In light of all
this, it is not surprising that Joseph Story called the English right to bear arms "more nominal
than real." 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1898 (3d ed. 1858). This is not
something of which Story approved, however, as he described the right to keep and bear arms as
"the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will . . . enable the people to resist and triumph
over them." Id. at § 1897. There is strong evidence that Story viewed the right to bear arms as a
collective right. He deplored "the growing indifference to any system of militia discipline" and
stated: "How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some form of organization, it
is difficult to see." Id.
68. The applicable provision in the English Bill of Rights provides "That the subjects which
are protestants may have arms for their defense suitable their conditions, and as allowed by law."
An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, I W. & M., Sess. 2, c.2 (1689) (emphasis added).

69. See

HALBROOK,

supra note 54, at 7-9.
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edly stronger British standing army to secure American independence.
The fact that the Founders initially restricted the establishment of a

national standing army70 indicates a mistrust of all standing armies,
even one that their new federal government might create.7 1 A local militia would protect against the domestic usurpation of power by rulers,

as well as protect against foreign invasion.7 It seems clear that the
Framers envisioned a right of the people to bear arms to oppose an
oppressive government, although the constitutional debates do not address whether such a right should exist for other purposes, such as selfdefense or hunting.

With this history in mind, the critical commentators have concluded that the second amendment right to bear arms is an individual
right that is not linked inextricably to the maintenance of an organized
militia.73 The right to rebel against an oppressive government cannot be

realized through government-controlled military forces; the individual
right to bear arms remains the key to liberty just as in the late eighteenth century. The importance of this right to rebel, combined with the

important common law right of self-defense, leads the critics to conclude that the right to possess arms, like other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, should be applied to the states.

4

Case law to the contrary is

criticized as outdated, ripe for overruling, or simply incorrect.7 5
While these commentators are clear in their rejection of the prevalent judicial view that the second amendment provides only a collective
right and is not applicable against the states, they are less clear in defining the precise scope of the individual right to bear arms which they

advocate. Those who address this point at all tend to agree that the
right should not be considered absolute and recognize that at least
70. Congress could maintain no standing army of its own without the consent of nine of the
thirteen states under the Articles of Confederation, but every state was required to "[k]eep up a
well regulated and disciplined militia." Weatherup, supra note 54, at 980. Also see George Mason's draft of the Virginia state bill of rights, America's first, which stated that "standing armies,
in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty." Rohner, supra note 42, at 56.
71. HALBROOK, supra note 54, at 58-72.
72. See STORY, supra note 67, at § 1897. Story notes that "The militia is the natural defense of a free country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic insurrections, and domestic
usurpations of power by rulers." Id. He also quotes Tacitus with approval: "Is there any escape
from a large standing army, but in a well disciplined militia?" Id. at § 1897 n.2.
73. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 54, at 194-97; Kates, supra note 6, at 267-73; Hardy
& Stampoly, Of Arms and the Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 62, 78-79 (1974).

74. However, some commentators would interpret the amendment to minimize federal
power, but would not apply it to the states. See Levine & Saxe, The Second Amendment: The
Right to Bear Arms, 7 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1969).
75. See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 54, at 155-92.
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some restrictions on some types of weapons would be permissible.76

However, they have difficulty articulating a convincing rationale for
limiting the right so that it remains consistent with their own characterization of its historic purposes. One possible theory is that the right
to possess arms extends only to those arms appropriate for opposing an
oppressive government. But this interpretation seemingly would exclude
nothing short of nuclear weapons."' Another approach would be to

limit the guarantee to weapons similar to those used in the eighteenth
century. 78 However, this approach excludes many weapons which
would be of obvious benefit in exercising the "right of revolution."
While the critics have chastised the courts for refusing to incorporate
historical evidence into their second-amendment analysis, they have
been equally myopic in their own approach. The commentators have
failed to delve below the surface of eighteenth-century thought to find

an explanation that would preserve the essence of the Framers' motivations but still be consistent with current social conditions. Proper second-amendment analysis requires consideration of both the Framers'
intent and the realities of the twentieth century.
II.

IDENTIFYING THE CORE CONCERNS BEHIND THE SECOND
AMENDMENT

With respect to the second amendment, it would be difficult to

imagine more sharply divergent positions than those taken by the
courts and the critical commentators. The commentators, relying on
their views of history and of the Framers' intent, claim that an unbro76. There tend to be two types of suggested limitations on the scope of the amendment. The
first type would find unconstitutional only the most restrictive types of regulation, such as confiscation or the outright prohibition of weapons. Therefore, restrictions such as licensing gun owners
and registering firearms would be permissible. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms:
A Necessary ConstitutionalGuarantee or an Outmoded Provision of the Bill of Rights, 31 ALB.
L. REV. 74, 86-87 (1967).
The other type of limitation is more concerned with defining the types of weapons protected
by the amendment. Some commentators would define the protected class as those included in the
Framers' meaning of the term "firearms," i.e. generally rifles, handguns, and shotguns. See McClure, supra note 8, at 211. Others suggest that firearms useful for organized military conflict
comprise the protected category. See Note, The Right to Bear Arms and Handgun Prohibition: A
Fundamental Rights Analysis, 14 N.C. CENT. L. 296, at 310 (1983) (this category would not
include handguns).
77. Even this may be an overly conservative statement, at least in the view of some actual or
potential revolutionaries. Che Guevara was quoted as saying in 1962, "We must proceed along the

path of liberation, even if that costs millions of atomic victims." D. ZIEGLER,
78.

WAR, PEACE, AND

263 (1984).
The most elaborate enunciation of this type is that of Kates, supra note 6, at 258-64.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
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ken line of federal cases and the overwhelming majority of state court
decisions are simply wrong. Judges, relying instead on this clear body
of precedent, dismiss the historical arguments of the commentators as
irrelevant.79 These positions are not necessarily irreconcilable and it is
possible to reach a conclusion combining valid arguments from both
sides.
Mere citation of precedent, particularly nineteenth-century precedent, is a rather unconvincing way of deciding claims made under the
Bill of Rights. A holding that the second amendment is basically different than other Bill of Rights' provisions should be supported by a more
satisfactory rationale than stare decisis. Yet the failure of courts to
venture beyond precedent does not mean that a satisfying distinction is
nonexistent; the second amendment is genuinely different from most
Bill of Rights' provisions. At the same time, few, if any, provisions of
the Constitution are interpreted by focusing solely on eighteenth century thought and applying it, in every detail, to twentieth-century
problems. The commentators' failure to recognize and deal seriously
with the ways in which twentieth-century America differs from eighteenth-century America makes the maximalist position on the second
amendment appear shallow. This is not to say that the concerns of the
Framers are to be disregarded; their basic concerns must be the starting point of constitutional analysis, and any acceptable rule of constitutional law must be consistent with those concerns.
An explanation of how the rights found in the second amendment
differ from rights such as those of religious belief and expression protected by the first amendment requires a brief discussion of the nature
and definition of a "right." While the word often is used to denote a
legal entitlement which could be taken away through normal government procedures, a constitutional right is something more. A constitutional right can be altered through the extraordinary process of amendment but it cannot be taken away through the normal majoritarian
procedures of the legislative system. In this sense, it is closer to a
"right" in the strongest sense of the word; that is, something belonging
to the individual which, without his consent, cannot be taken away." In
79. See supra, notes 12-50, and accompanying text.
80. Not everyone would recognize this type of a right; some would subordinate individual
human rights to the overall welfare of the community. E.H. Bradley's statement is an example of
this extreme view: "The rights of the individual today are not worth serious criticism ....
The
welfare of the community is the end and is the ultimate standard. And over its members the right
of its moral organism is absolute," quoted in Pennock, Rights, Natural Rights and Human
Rights-A General View, in HUMAN RIGHTS 1,4 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1981). But
jurisprudence in recent years has seen strong defenses of the existence of strong individual rights.
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a nation committed to democracy, there must be justification for the

frustration of majoritarianism implicit in the recognition of a strong
right. Justification for the recognition of individual rights is based ulti-

mately upon the contention that certain freedoms or entitlements are
essential to human existence, or at least to an existence granting
human beings the dignity they deserve.8 1
With this in mind, it would seem that rights can be divided into
two categories. First, there are rights which might be described as pri-

mary. These rights require no further elaboration or explanation beyond their mere enunciation to justify their existence. It is obvious that
such rights, which would include the right to be free from arbitrary
deprivations of life, liberty or property, the right to have and express
one's own beliefs, religious and otherwise, and the right to be free from
torture or cruel and unusual punishments, are fundamental to human

dignity. While considerable disagreement may exist over the precise
scope of such rights, and the means necessary to implement them, no

significant controversy exists as to their existence in some basic,
unadorned form. To a person who shares basic Western political and

philosophical values even a request to explain why such rights are recognized will seem strange.82

The right to possess firearms is not this type of right. It is by no
means evident that a life without access to firearms is lacking in some
fundamental way. Nations which share a basic commitment to Western
values vary widely in their attitudes toward private ownership of fire-

arms,8 s as do Americans." The differences of opinion are different

Probably the most widely quoted recent definition of this strong type of right is Ronald Dworkin's:
"if someone has a right to something, then it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even
though it would be in the general interest to do so." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
269 (1977).
81. See the various viewpoints collected in HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 80. See also, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR at 1, U.N. Sales No.
E.73.XIV.2 (1948).
82. In other cultures the existence of such rights are doubtful, or at least defined quite
differently. See Pollis & Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 13 (A. Pollis & P. Schwab eds. 1979); M. STACKHOUSE, CREEDS, SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A STUDY IN THREE CULTURES (1984).
83. See, e.g., Greenwood & Magaddino, Comparative Cross-Cultural Statistics, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 31 (D. Kates ed. 1979), and Hardy &
Chotiner, The Potential for Civil Liberties Violations in the Enforcement of Handgun Prohibition, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 194 (D. Kates ed. 1974).
84. The latest Gallup Poll figures indicate that Americans favor handgun registration by a
margin of 56 percent to 40 percent. Handgun Signup Favored, Even By Owners, Chicago SunTimes, May 26, 1985, at 24. For contrasting non-scholarly opinions on the issue, see Gresham,
Guns and Hunting: Fact vs. Fantasy, in THE ISSUE OF GUN CONTROL (T. Draper ed. 1981) and
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from dissention about the first amendment, for example. While wide
disagreement might be expected on the particular application of the
religion clauses, very little disagreement would be expressed to the
unadorned statement that individuals should have the right to freely
practice their religion. There is substantial disagreement with respect
to the unadorned assertion that individuals should have the right to
own firearms.8 5
The right to possess firearms also differs from the typical right
recognized in the Bill of Rights in that it involves an object. Primary
rights tend to be concerned with intangible attributes such as belief,
privacy, and expression. The right to possess a thing is obviously different. In addition, the basic orientation of the Bill of Rights toward property is not to protect its ownership in absolute terms, but to require
that if government acts to take property away, it must provide the
owner with just compensation, and provide due process." It can be argued that the right to possess certain types of objects is primary and is
necessary for proper human existence. But if a list of such objects were
to be drawn, it seems clear that things such as food and shelter would
rank ahead of firearms.8 7 Yet the anomaly remains: government may
take away a citizen's home, respecting due process and with just compensation, but the second amendment at first glance would not allow
government to take away the citizen's firearms. The right of firearms
possession, in short, is substantially different from primary rights recognized by the Constitution.
To say that a right is not primary is not to say, however, that it
does not exist. Other rights, which might be labelled "secondary" or
"derivative," do exist and are recognized by the Constitution. Such secondary or derivative rights are not self-evidently necessary to preserve
human dignity, but exist because of the conviction that they are essential to the preservation of primary rights. Such secondary rights do require explanation as to their connection with primary rights, and the
extent of the connection may change over time.
The most obvious example of a secondary or derivative right in the
Corbett, Living Without Handguns, in THE

ISSUE OF GUN CONTROL (T. Draper ed. 1981).
85. See supra note 84, and accompanying text.
86. U.S. CONST. amend, V and XIV, § I.
87. STACKHOUSE, supra note 82, discusses attitudes of different cultures toward these "positive" rights, i.e., rights to have something as opposed simply to being free of government interference in one's life ("negative" rights). The U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 81,
includes a number of positive rights, among them the right to an adequate standard of living, the
right to education, the right to work, and the right to rest and leisure. It is not surprising that the
right to own firearms is not accorded equal importance.
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Bill of Rights is the right of state sovereignty provided by the tenth
amendment. 88 It is not self-evident that strong, autonomous local units
of government are essential to preserve human dignity. Many of the
Framers believed that small units of government were more representative and respecting of human rights, and the protection of "states'
rights" is meant not as an end in itself, but as a means of bringing
about respect for the underlying, primary individual rights. History has
demonstrated that smaller units of government are not invariably more
protective of human rights, and often the federal government has had
to assert its power and limit state power in order to protect individuals
from mistreatment by these supposedly more sensitive government
units. 89
Situations will arise where an extension of a derivative right may
in fact interfere with the primary rights which the derivative right was
established to protect. Broad expansion of the concept of states' rights,
for example, can serve to hinder individual rights. In such a situation it
is necessary to rethink, and possibly redefine, the scope of the secondary right to assure that it is fulfilling its intended function. It is inappropriate to sacrifice the primary right to preserve the derivative right.
With regard to the tenth amendment, recent case law illustrates
this principle quite well. In the 1976 case of National League of Cities
v. Usery,90 the Supreme Court attempted to define an area of state
sovereign immunity without carefully thinking through the underlying
values which the tenth amendment was meant to secure. Instead, the
Court treated the amendment, with its guarantee of state sovereignty
as an end in itself. 91 A decade of case law after National League of
Cities proved that it was quite impossible to define rationally the scope
of state sovereignty and the scope of the tenth amendment when it was
approached on such terms. 92 Finally, in the recent case of Garcia v.
88. "'Thepowers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
89. Federal control has been asserted by assuring equal protection of the laws, through judicial decisions and through much legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
1971 (1976 ed.).
90. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
91. Id. at 842-43.
92. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court consistently has narrowed the scope of state
sovereignty without ever providing a satisfactory definition of the concept. See Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150 (1983); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); and
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Lower courts had
even more difficulty in applying the Supreme Court's tests. See, e.g., Williams v. Eastside Mental
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San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,93 the Court changed direction and overruled National League of Cities. In doing so, the Court
identified the core concern of the tenth amendment as preserving governmental structures, including those at the state and local level,
through which the states' citizens might participate effectively in the
process of government. 9' This process, in turn, will assure proper respect for local concerns in federal legislation. Having identified this as
the primary right underlying the derivative concept of "states' rights,"
courts now can interpret and apply the tenth amendment to protect the
underlying right and at the same time refrain from extending the derivative right in a way which actually might frustrate realization of the
primary right. Unthinking devotion to "states' rights" can interfere
with individual rights, the protection of which is the justification for
recognizing a "right" possessed by a state in the first place.
Similarly, the second amendment requires careful analysis of its
nature as a means to an end or group of ends. It is evident that possession of arms is not valued as an end in itself. This is made clear not
only by the differences between the right to bear arms and other Bill of
Rights guarantees discussed above, but also by the evidence marshalled
by both sides in the current second amendment debate. Case law, as
discussed, places great emphasis on the militia clause of the amendment. This is justified since it provides an explanation of the ultimate
purpose of the amendment. However, it is not the words "A well regulated Militia" but the following "being necessary to the security of a
free state" which are most significant. Just as the right to bear arms is
necessary for a reason, so a well-regulated militia also is necessary, not
as an end in itself, but to assure the fundamental right contained in the
second amendment: security.
The historical sources cited by the critical commentators also
make it clear that security is the primary goal behind the second
amendment. The commentators have produced much evidence of the
importance of arms to the Framers, but it is clear that arms are important as a means, not an end. There are several types of "security" that
historical sources indicate were important to the Framers: (a) security
Health Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 671 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982) (operating a
mental health center is not a protected state function); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d
1033 (6th Cir. 1979) (operating a municipal airport is a protected state function); United States
v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978) (licensing drivers is a protected state function); Friends of
the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (regulating
traffic on public roads is not a protected state function).
93. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
94. Id. at 1016-18.
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against foreign invasion;95 (b) security against tyranny. by the federal
government; 96 (c) security against oppression by state or local government, 97 and (d) security of the individual against crime.98 Both sides of
the second amendment debate should agree that these rights of security

are the true concerns behind the provision and that militias and individually-owned firearms merely are means of securing those rights.99
Once the right of security, consisting of these several subparts, is
recognized to be the principal concern of the second amendment, it is
possible to analyze the constitutionality of firearms restrictions in a
manner which does not ignore the true purposes of the Framers or the
realities of the twentieth century. The central inquiry in each case must
be whether the proposed restriction poses a substantial threat to any
95.

HALDROOK,

supra note 54, quotes from both sides of the ratification debate. Federalist

Tench Coxe wrote: "The militia of these free commonwealths, entitled and accustomed to their
arms, when compared with any possible army, must be tremendous and irresistable." Id. at 68,
quoting from the Pennsylvania Gazette, Feb. 20, 1788. A prominent anti-federalist pamphleteer
asked: "Had we a standing army when the British invaded our peaceful shores? . . . And which
of you, my fellow citizens, is afraid of any invasion from foreign powers that our brave militia
would not be able immediately to repel." Id. at 70, quoting from the Pennsylvania Herald, Oct.
17, 1787. See also STORY, supra note 67, at § 1897 ("The militia is the natural defence [sic] of a
free country against sudden foreign invasions.
...).
96. Again, evidence comes from both sides of the ratification debate. Federalist Noah Webster wrote: "The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the
whole body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops
....
"HALBROOK, supra note 54, at 68, quoting from a pamphlet written by N. Webster. On the
anti-federalist side, similar sentiments were expressed: "The government is only just and perfectly
free . . . where there is also a dernier [last] resort, or real power left in the community to defend
themselves against any attack on their liberties." Id. at 72, quoting from an anti-federalist tract.
97. Jefferson wrote, with respect to Shay's Rebellion: "The late rebellion, in Massachusetts
has given more alarm than I think it should have done . . . No country should be . . . long
without one." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) in VA. COMM. ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GOV'T, WE THE STATES 231-32 (1964), in recognition that state governments
might also be oppressive and justify armed resistance.
98. See Kates, supra note 6, at 233-34. The fact that the political rebel is a criminal within
the legal system against which he rebels indicates that weapons are to be valued both for their
utility in bringing about (legitimate?) revolutions and suppressing (illigitimate?) revolutions. See
STORY, supra note 67, at § 1897: "The militia is the natural defence [sic] of a free country
against . . . domestic insurrections, and domestic usurpations of power by rulers."
99. Kates cites authority to demonstrate the Founders' love of guns in themselves. The most
notable is effusive praise of the gun by Jefferson: "it gives boldness, enterprise and independence
to the mind .

. .

. Let your gun therefore be the constant companion of your walks." Kates, supra

note 6, at 229, quoting from THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 51 (Foley ed. 1967). But clearly, arms
are in the Constitution because of their instrumental qualities in assuring the ends discussed
supra, and not because they were, along with such non-constitutionally protected objects as the
violin and hot air balloons, among Jefferson's favorite things. See F. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON:
AN INTIMATE HISTORY 58, 255 (1974). Jefferson, incidentally, hated dogs, and suggested that
they all be exterminated. Id. at 22. Does this suggest yet another reason he would urge that a gun
be a constant companion on one's walks?
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part of the right of security. To some extent, firearms will be necessary
to assure security, and to that extent the second amendment will protect them. But when government action, although clearly interfering
with the unlimited freedom of the individual to possess weapons, does
so in a way which does not interfere with the underlying right of security, such action is constitutional. To hold otherwise would be to sacrifice ends to means.
III.

APPLYING THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A GUARANTEE OF A
RIGHT OF SECURITY

By focusing on the right of security rather than firearms as the
primary concern of the second amendment, it is possible to decide what
types of limitations on the possession and use of firearms may create
constitutional problems. Four types of security: security against foreign
invasion, federal oppression, state oppression, and crime will be examined. The possible existence of a constitutional interest in preserving
the right to own firearms for some reason apart from security, such as
commercial or subsistence hunting must also be considered.
Several general types of firearms legislation must be examined in
relation to each of the rights of security. Some restrictions, such as
those restricting the carrying of a concealed weapon1"' or requiring gun
dealers to be licensed,' 0 ' are generally accepted both as to their consti02
tutionality and their wisdom and do not require extensive analysis.
The types of restrictions which do merit careful examination fall into
the following four categories: (1) registration requirements calling for
the maintenance of records of the sale and ownership of weapons;' (2)
"permissive" licensing of gun owners; that is, licensing guns under
standards which a large majority of those who wish to own firearms
easily satisfy;'04 (3) "restrictive" licensing of gun owners, that is, licensing limited to a small number of applicants who can demonstrate
E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 28.426 (1981).
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-28 (1975).
102. Kates, for example, has little difficulty in conceding the constitutionality of such restrictions while maintaining that more severe restrictions would be invalid. See Kates, supra note
6, at 264-67. For a survey of existing firearms regulation see WRIGHT, Rossi & DALY, supra note
25, at 243-72.
103. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 923 (1976) which requires firearms dealers, among other things to
"maintain ... records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other dispositions, of
firearms ....
104. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 129B (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981) which calls for
the issuance of firearms identification cards to all those who apply with the exception of certain
well-defined and uncontroversial groups, e.g., recent convicts, drug addicts, etc.
100.

101.
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some special need for firearms; 10 6 and (4) outright prohibitions on the
possession of either all firearms or certain types of firearms. 10 6 Since
federal, state or local governments might enact these restrictions, each
type of restriction must be evaluated at every level.
It will be noted that throughout the following discussion the classic
second amendment controversy over the nature of the right guaranteed
by the amendment as either individual or collective is largely absent.
This is due to the fact that by redefining the purpose behind the
amendment as security rather than firearms, the two views are not antithetical, but are rather closely linked. The security sought by the
amendment is that of a "free state." On its surface, this objective is
collective; it seems to be a "state's right." Yet the adjective "free" obviously indicates that the security of the state is called for only insofar
as it assures the security of the people. In other words, the collective
exercise of the right is one way to assure preservation of the individual
right to security. It may be chosen by the people as the preferred
method of assuring the right, as will be discussed below, but ultimately
the collective right exists not for its own sake but to assure the existence of the individual right insofar as it is necessary.10 7
A.

Security Against Foreign Invasion

There is much evidence that the Framers of the Constitution considered a citizen militia to be the best defense against threats of foreign
invasion.10 8 This is unsurprising in light of the fact that it was such a
force which won independence by defeating Great Britain's standing
army. Not only was a citizen militia thought of as effective, it was
considered far less dangerous to civil liberties than the maintenance of
10 9
a strong standing army.
105. The classic example is New York's "Sullivan Law," N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.00 to
265.40 (making it illegal to possess a firearm) and § 400 (creating licensing procedure for those
who wish to legally possess firearms, despite provisions of § 265) (McKinney 1979).
. 106. E.g., Ordinance No. 81-11 of the Village of Morton Grove, Ill., at issue in Quilici v.
Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 194 (1983),
discussed supra notes 32-44, and accompanying text. See also, Ordinance of Mar. 19, 1982 of the
City of Chicago, Ill., amending the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago ch. 11.1-3(c) to prohibit any handgun registration after Apr. 10, 1982, at issue and upheld against constitutional
attack in Skar v. Byrne, 556 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Il. 1983), affid, 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1984).
107. Just as the "state's rights" of the tenth amendment exist only as necessary means to
the protection of underlying individual rights. See supra notes 90-94, and accompanying text. See
also Beschle, Defining the Scope ofState Sovereignty Under the Tenth Amendment: A Structural
Approach, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 163 (1984).
108. See supra note 95, and accompanying text.
109. ' It is against sound policy for a free people to keep up large military establish-

HeinOnline -- 9 Hamline L. Rev. 91 1986

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

The Constitution does not prohibit the existence of a standing
army. On the contrary, several constitutional provisions seem to assume
that one will exist. While argument will continue over the political issues of its proper size and composition, most people would agree that a
standing army is necessary in the twentieth century to assure security
against foreign invasion. This does not lead to the conclusion that individual arms are irrelevant to protect the same interest. Some commentators have contended that the last line of defense against a foreign
invader would be individual, perhaps guerrilla, resistance."'
The question is not whether individual arms are essential to protect against foreign invasion. The constitutional question is whether a
legislative decision that arms are not essential (or even valuable) for
such a purpose will be respected. In other words, is a decision to rely
exclusively on organized military forces to guard against foreign invasion constitutionally suspect? If the political process delegates protection of this aspect of the right of security to the military, the decision is
the product of sincere conviction that this type of decision best assures
such security. No one involved in the process has any interest in weakening the community's security against invasion. Generally, decisions
reached by the political process are constitutionally suspect when they
result in deprivation of the rights of an individual or a minority in order to give benefits to the majority. When the interests of all are implicated equally in a decision, the results of the political process are not
suspect.11
The right of security against foreign invasion must be secured
through means chosen by the political process. A decision to rely entirely on organized armies, based on the rationale that the marginal
effect of individual arms against foreign invasion would be offset totally
by the anticipated benefits to the other rights of security, particularly
the right to security against crimes committed with privately-owned
ments and standing armies in time of peace, both from the enormous expenses, with
which they are attended, and the facile means which they afford to ambitious and unprincipled rulers, to subvert the government, or trample upon the rights of the people.
STORY, supra note 67, at § 1897. See also HALBROOK, supra note 54, at 69-72; and Rohner,
supra note 54, at 56-57.
110. See, e.g., Hardy, The Second Amendment as a Restraint on State and Federal Firearm Restrictions, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 171, 183-85
(D. Kates ed. 1979).
I1I.
Where a "decision is equally in or against the antecedent whole interest of each person," rather than allowing a majority to assign harms to a minority while assuming no risk of
harm themselves, strong ground exist for allocating the decision to the political process. R. DWORKIN,

A

MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

87 (1985).

HeinOnline -- 9 Hamline L. Rev. 92 1986

SECOND AMENDMENT

weapons, seems completely justified.
There is no reason to believe that a significant number of those
involved in the political process are opposed to providing effective protection against foreign invasion. Therefore a decision to rely entirely on
standing armies and organized state militias for such protection seems
rational and it appears that any legislative decision to restrict or even
prohibit individual firearms ownership will pose no serious threat to the
right of security against foreign invasion.
B.

Security Against Oppression by the Federal Government

Even as they sought to create an effective national government, the
Framers clearly were concerned with the dangers of excessive federal
power.112 The Bill of Rights is largely the legacy of the anti-federalist
opponents of the Constitution and their fears concerning the potential
power of the new national government.113 There is considerable evidence to support the contention that the second amendment primarily
was concerned with assuring the existence of an effective counterweight
to potential federal oppression. 4 In discussing the right of security
against foreign invasion, there was no need to distinguish between state
and federal legislation. Neither level of government would have any
interest in failing to adequately provide such security. But in analyzing
the right of security against federal oppression, there is a necessary
distinction between state or local legislation limiting firearms possession
and similar federal legislation.
When state or local legislators limit firearms possession through
legislation which is the product of their own representative political
processes, the decision poses no threat to the right of security against
federal oppression. A decision at the state level to limit arms to the
organized militia, or to disarm, simply may indicate the state's conclusion that individual firearms ownership is now irrelevant to protection
against federal oppression. History makes it clear that the Constitution
provides the defense against such oppression through the courts and the
participation of the states in federal legislative processes.115 Federal ac112. See A. HAMILTON, J. MADISON & J. JAY, THE FEDERALIST (1901 ed.), especially nos.
XXVI, XXVII, and XXVIII: "The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
Common Defense Considered."
113. See generally, Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in 1 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST (H. Storing ed. 1981).

114. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
115. This is true of other derivative rights provisions, such as the tenth amendment. See
supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
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tion requires more serious examination. It seems clear that the second
amendment prohibits federal attempts to disarm the states' organized
militias. It follows that a state's decision that armed individual citizens
are important as part of the overall militia system to protect against
possible federal oppression should be respected. Most states have
adopted some form of a right to bear arms as a part of their state
constitution. 11 While the language of these guarantees varies significantly from state to state, it seems clear that through these provisions
some states have attempted to ensure individual, as well as collective,
rights of firearms possession. When a state has made this decision, the
argument against of federal interference is strong.
History, however, complicates the analysis and cannot be ignored.
The Framers of the Constitution clearly believed in a right of revolution and acted on that belief by rebelling against England.11 7 Yet the
system they established, as any system of positive law must, disallowed
such a right. Basic change can be brought about through the process of
constitutional amendment and Article V of the Constitution can be
seen as an attempt to tame and institutionalize the right of revolution.1 18 Violent revolution was rejected, if not by the terms of the Constitution itself, then certainly by subsequent history, particularly that of
the Civil War. The federal government properly may resist violent
revolution. In light of this, what is left of the second amendment as a
provision assuring security against federal oppression? Does it really
assure the right to maintain private arms sufficient to rebel against the
federal government?
The amendment was meant to assure security against federal oppression. Historically, the structure of the federal government has been
the most effective means to this end. The states and their people contribute to the federal lawmaking process and can check its abuses, 9
while the courts provide a further check on constitutional violations.
Beyond these checks, orthodox second amendment doctrine protects organized state militias. Would private firearms ownership add anything
significant to the balance of federal and local power? History and logic
indicate that it would not.
116.

See Dowlut & Knoop, supra note 52, at 177.

117. See Reid, The Irrelevance of the Declaration, in

LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

46, 52-54 (H. Hartog ed. 1981) asserting that this was a
belief in a legal, not simply a moral right.
118. Which would add strength to the argument that the amendment process is political
and not subject to judicial review. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939).
119. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE LAW
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Post-eighteenth century history, particularly that of the Civil War,
indicates that the federal government may prevent the possession and
stockpiling of weapons which pose a threat to its existence. Any contrary conclusion would lead to the bizarre spectacle of a government
engaged in an arms race with its own citizens, one which the government, no doubt, would win. Even advocates of a strong individual right
to bear arms, while basing their arguments on the right to oppose federal tyranny, implicitly seem to undercut their own position and indicate its artificiality by conceding that some types of arms may be restricted by law. 20 If one takes seriously the contention that private
arms should stand as a credible threat in case of federal tyranny, then
it follows that the people must be allowed to have those arms necessary
to offset the considerable military capability of the federal government.
Today this would include such things as machine-guns, flamethrowers,
light artillery and much more. No one seriously would contend that the
federal government cannot regulate these weapons. Arguing for a
strong second amendment in the interest of providing a credible threat
to federal military power while at the same time conceding that the
amendment extends only to rifles, handguns, and shotguns (the general
types of weapons in use in the late eighteenth century) is self-contradictory. The right asserted is obviously insufficient to satisfy the asserted need for the right.
History and logic do not permit one to take the right of armed
revolution as a serious proposition of positive constitutional law. Only
the legal revolutions provided by the political process are recognized by
the Constitution. Constitutional processes, rather than firearms, are the
true safeguard against infringements of the right of security against
federal oppression. Even if we do take the right of armed revolution
seriously, the existence of organized state militias will satisfy this interest. If there is a legitimate second amendment concern with protecting
individual firearms ownership, it exists elsewhere.
C. Security Against Oppression by State Government
The Framers of the Constitution were concerned primarily with
possible threats to liberty posed by the federal government, but subsequent history has shown that state and local governments have interfered with individual rights at least as often as the national govern120. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 6, at 261: "[T]he amendment does not protect the possession of fully automated weapons, grenades, rocket launchers, flame throwers, artillery pieces,
tanks, nuclear devices, and so on," despite their "military utility."
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ment. Furthermore, the post-Civil War constitutional amendments led
to the application of much of the Bill of Rights to the states. Should
the second amendment be read to endorse the position that firearms are
an important means of assuring individual security against state oppression, and should the amendment join those other provisions which
limit state action?
On the surface, it is plausible that individually-owned firearms
serve as a deterrent to state-approved deprivations of individual rights.
When the state acts through its police to deprive individuals of rights,
firearms might be considered useful, if not essential, to protect those
rights. Proponents of strong individual rights under the second amendment have argued, for example, that firearms would have been useful
to southern Blacks during the century following the Civil War. Southern legislatures of the the post-Reconstruction era, however, enacted
121
laws that kept Blacks unarmed.
A closer inquiry reveals a more complex picture. Just as the Constitution provides structures which have proven to be more effective
than individual firearms in limiting possible federal oppression, it also
contains similar safeguards to protect against systematic state abuses.
Federal courts, federal troops, and federal legislation pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment have been effective in this regard in a more lasting and profound way than privately-owned firearms could have been.
The constitutional defects in the post-Reconstruction statutes adopted
by the southern legislatures included the inequality of treatment between races, and the unrepresentative political process by which legislation was enacted. Clearly, legislation that disarmed only Blacks or that
was enforced solely against minority groups should have been declared
unconstitutional, but not because of the second amendment. Rather,
such statutes clearly violate the fourteenth amendment and its guarantee of equal protection of the laws.' 22
The fourteenth amendment provides an individual with the right to
security against oppressive state government. The possession of firearms
has become irrelevant to the individual's right against oppressive government, state or federal, because effective legal and political means
have developed in the latter half of the twentieth century to insure protection of the individual's rights. 2 3 Thus, when the federal government
121.

See, e.g., Kates, Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States, in

RESTRICTING HANDGUNS supra note 110, at 12-15.

122. The Supreme Court's error in Cruikshank, see supra notes 8-10, was not in its analysis
of the second amendment, but rather in its failure to apply effectively the equal protection clause.
123. Equal protection as a basic principle or "model" running through constitutional litiga-
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is willing to ensure minority and individual rights against state oppression, and when state political processes function properly, a state decision which determines that individually-owned firearms are irrelevant
to the individual's right against government oppression is rational and
should be considered constitutional. Such a legislative decision will be
subject to review by federal as well as state, courts to assure that its
implementation does not violate the equal protection clause or any
other constitutional provision.
Likewise, a federal decision that prohibits the possession of firearms does not abridge the right to security against oppressive state government. If the people, acting through their elected federal representatives, decide that individual firearm possession is unnecessary, then in
light of the existence of other means of protection available, their decision poses no substantial threat to the individual's right of security
against state government oppression pursuant to the second
amendment.
D. Security Against Crime

The analysis of the, right of security against foreign invasion and
oppression by federal or state government, although establishing the
marginal value (if any) of individual arms, still has provided no convincing rationale to support firearms restriction consistent with the basic concerns of the second amendment. Even if privately-owned weapons add almost nothing to the ability of the people to resist threats of
government oppression, they still would not detract from these aspects
of the right of security. Individual firearms ownership could be thought
of as a positive contribution to the right of security.
However, such a conclusion cannot stand after analysis of the right
of security against crime. Although most of the scholarly critiques of
current second amendment doctrine primarily discuss the value of privately-owned firearms in opposing government oppression, these commentators also have identified security against lawless individuals, unconnected with government, as one of the interests the amendment
seeks to protect."" This facet of the concerns which underlie the second
amendment may be seen as an outgrowth of 'the common law right of
self-defense; while firearms will not be always necessary for self-defense, in certain instances firearms will make effective self-defense
tion is largely a post-World War II phenomenon. See generally L.
TIONAL LAW 991-1135 (1978).
124. See supra note 98, and accompanying text.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
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much more likely.
Clearly, defense against crime is the most important security-related interest in the minds of persons who own firearms today, and of
those who are advocates in the political arena of a strong legal right to
ownership of firearms. 12 5 Unlike the right to armed revolt against the
federal or state governments, it is not clear that history has mooted the
importance of the right to armed defense against crime. Thus, any
analysis of the second amendment should take this facet of the right of
security seriously.
A critical analysis must not adopt the position that legislation
which restricts firearms is invalid without considering the historical developments of the last two hundred years. In the eighteenth century,
permanent armed police forces were nonexistent; well into the nineteenth century, such forces were rudimentary and unlikely to inspire
sufficient confidence for people to entrust those forces with the responsibility of defending the community against crime.12 6 The twentieth
century has seen the development of much more professional and effective police forces. In addition, plausible evidence supports the contention that free access to firearms actually contributes to the insecurity of
the individual against the threat of various forms of violence.127
These historical developments confront the people with a choice. If
citizens believe that the absence of controls on firearms makes them
less secure, they can maintain the right of the individual to possess
arms freely only by sacrificing some of their security against crime in
the interest of preserving what was intended to be only a means to that
end. Or, by limiting access to firearms, they can adjust the means in
the interest of better achieving the end. The latter choice seems more
consistent with the view of the Constitution as a document concerned
with unchanging, fundamental rights to be maintained regardless of the
social setting caused by historical change. To require strict adherence
to a particular firearms policy when evidence proves that the policy
destroys security which is the fundamental goal of the amendment,
1 28
would be historical formalism of the worst kind.
125. When asked to identify the most important reason they owned a gun, 21 percent of all
gun owners and 45 percent of handgun owners cited self-defense at home or work. Another three
percent of gun owners and eight percent of handgun owners needed weapons for law enforcement
or security work. The rest cited hunting or collecting, which are unrelated to security. WRIGHT,
Rossi & DALY, supra note 24, at 96.
126. See Malcolm, supra note 54, at 290-91.
127. See generally, NEWTON & ZIMRING, supra note 2, at 61-68.
128. In critiquing those who advocate strict adherence to the "Framers' intent" in constitutional interpretation, Dworkin discusses the difference between "abstract" intentions, the broad

HeinOnline -- 9 Hamline L. Rev. 98 1986

SECOND AMENDMENT

This is not to say that the empirical conclusions of people who
would ban firearms are necessarily correct. It is to assert, however, that
a rational legislature representing the views of its people could come to
such a conclusion. Such a conclusion would seem entirely free of any
taint from improper motives since it is inconceivable that a legislature
intentionally would vote to decrease the security of its citizens, especially in a way that would not save any substantial sums of money. 12 9
State and local legislation restricting the private ownership of firearms
is a rational and constitutionally permissible attempt to maximize the
fundamental concern underlying the second amendment, the security of
the people.
Federal legislation may present more substantial problems with respect to the right of security against crime. The federal government has
not attempted to provide local police functions. Consequently, state and
local government provide the only forum for people to choose collectively the best way to protect themselves against crime. The people of
each state, it would seem, are entitled to their own choice regarding the
desirability of privately owned firearms. Just as the people of a state
may opt against individual firearms ownership, so might another state
reach the opposite conclusion. Federal interference with such a decision
would seem improper.
Deference to state and local decisions that private firearms ownership contributes to security against crime need not invalidate all federal
firearms legislation. Security against crime, even if it requires individually-owned firearms, does not require that those firearms be unregistered. Nor does security against crime dictate that owners of firearms
need not be licensed, as long as the licensing scheme is permissive and
allows ownership except for persons such as convicted felons whom the
state has deprived of that right. Only when federal legislation interferes
substantially with state choices about who may own firearms, either
through a system of restrictive licensing or through outright prohibition
of private ownership, will that federal legislation interfere with the allocation of decision-making authority which the second amendment
envisions.
ends sought by a legislator, and "concrete" intentions, the specific routes chosen by the legislator
to achieve the broad ends. Where implementing both the abstract and concrete intentions is impossible because they conflict, one must be seen as dominant. DWORKIN,, supra note I 11, at 48-51.
In this case, it appears that the second amendment provides, in its language, both an abstract
intent (preservation of the people's security) and concrete intentions (militias and private firearms
ownership). When these intentions conflict, security should be seen as the dominant concern.
129. See supra note I11.
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An examination of the type of firearm in question is also necessary. Firearms appropriate for use by individuals to protect themselves
or their homes against crime should not be subject to federal prohibition, but weapons that lack a relationship to assuring security against
crime should be. This approach will allow the federal prohibition of
weapons such as machine-guns and flamethrowers that almost everyone
would concede may be prohibited. In addition, the rationale for these
exceptions will be better than some commentators' almost metaphysical
attempts to classify weapons as within or outside of second amendment
protection based on whether the weapon is one which was valued in the
1780's or is a "lineal descendant" of such a weapon. 180
E. Possible Interests in Firearms Apart From Security

It seems clear that the Framer's primary purpose for the second
amendment was the security of the people. But it may be appropriate
to mention other reasons for private ownership of firearms that the
commentators have put forward. Although a substantial percentage of
people who own firearms do so to provide security against crime, most
American gun owners do not own them primarily for security. 131 The
most common reason cited for the ownership of firearms is hunting. " 2
Other non-security reasons that substantial numbers of gun owners give
include target shooting, gun collecting, and because the owner "just
likes to have one."183 However harmless or even beneficial these latter
three interests may be, it seems clear that none of them rise to the level
of a constitutional right. The same is true of recreational hunting."
A small number of hunters, however, make their living by that
activity and another relatively small group of gun owners require weapons for use in other occupations.13 5 Government attempts to interfere
with lawful occupations which require weapons do create constitutional
problems. However, those problems flow more from other constitutional
provisions, particularly the due process clause, than from the second
130.

See Kates, supra note 6, at 258-61.

131. WRIGHT, Rossi & DALY, supra note 24, at 96.
132. Id. Fifty-four percent of gun owners list hunting as the most important reason for their
ownership of guns. Among handgun owners, however, self-defense at home and work is the most
commonly-cited reason.
133. Id.
134. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
135. Three percent of all gun owners, and eight percent of handgun owners, own them primarily for use in a law enforcement or security job. WRIGHT, Rossi & DALY, supra note 24, at
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amendment.1 86 These problems should not serve as serious impediments
to the main thrust of most firearms legislation. They will prevent only
the outright prohibition of ownership by those who demonstrate a jobrelated need for firearms, an exception which almost certainly will present no particular controversy. 3 7 These considerations should be kept
in mind, but they are of only minimal importance in analyzing the
proper interpretation of the second amendment.
IV.

FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF RECOGNIZING THE SECOND
AMENDMENT AS PROVIDING A RIGHT OF SECURITY

Recognizing a right of personal security as the core of the second
amendment may have implications far beyond its contribution to understanding the amendment itself. A most interesting implication
would appear in constitutional matters involving criminal law and procedure. The concept of a right of security may provide a justification
for the use of "balancing tests" in this field.
Although the term "right" can be used in a weak sense to describe
an entitlement which exists only because it is recognized by statutory
or decisional law and therefore can be taken away through normal
democratic lawmaking procedures, it is more commonly and usefully
used to denote something greater. Used in its strong sense, the term
"right" describes something that people have by virtue of their citizenship or humanity and that a majority vote cannot take simply because
the majority has decided that' such a deprivation would further the
common good.' 3 8 If a right is to be denied or limited, it must be in the
interest of preserving another right of equal or greater importance.
Adopting this framework and recognizing that the concept of a
constitutional right generally uses the term "right" in its strong sense,
it is difficult to understand the frequent use of balancing tests that
weigh criminal defendants' fourth, fifth, sixth, or seventh amendment
rights against the perceived social benefits gained by efficient functioning of the criminal justice system. If, in fact, rights never are defeated
by mere democratic interests, the balance must always be struck in
favor of the individual right. Yet this clearly is not the case in areas
such as the fourth amendment, where use of the term "unreasonable"
136. See TRIBE, supra note 123, at 948-53.
137. The stringent gun control ordinance of Morton Grove, Ill., for example, contains exceptions for "peace officers," "keepers of prisons," members of the armed forces, watchmen and
security guards employed "for the protection of persons ... and property.
and authorized
state agents and investigators. 695 F.2d at 264.
138. See supra note 80.
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to denote what is forbidden seems to invite balancing,"'9 and also where
the language seems much more absolute, as in the fifth amendment
140
guarantee against self-incrimination.
One example is the classic "fair trial-free press" issue. When the
media seeks to publicize details of a crime it may prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial. There is an obvious way to preserve both the
first amendment rights of the press and the due process rights of the
defendant. The press would be allowed to publish and, if necessary, the
defendant would be set free. But courts'" and most commentators 2
do not take this approach. Rather, they opt for trimming back one of
the competing rights in order to allow the court system to do its job. 4"
If rights are limited, the restriction should be in deference to another right. Yet there is no explicit right of the public to a well-functioning system of criminal prosecution apparent in the Constitution.
However, if the second amendment confers upon citizens the basic
right to personal security, not just the right to firearms, and also confers the derivative right to establish appropriate government structures
to obtain that security, it is possible to balance this right against that of
the defendant. In this case, the right is balanced against another right
rather than balanced against a majoritarian interest. This is not to say
that such balancing always or even usually should result in automatic
deference to the right of security, but it does provide an justifiable explanation for using a balancing test when dealing with a criminal defendant's constitutional right. In essence, the second amendment right
of security is also an individual right, albeit one that requires collective
action to protect it. The full impact of recognizing a right of security as
a constitutional right is significant and requires more consideration.
As long as the second amendment is viewed as ultimately concerned with firearms, in all likelihood it will continue to be treated as a
139. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
... U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
140. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
141. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (no absolute barriers to
publication of pretrial publicity, but injunction might be justified under some circumstances pursuant to a balancing test).
142. See, e.g., Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse
Press Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. I, 22 (1971); Comment, Gagging the Press in Criminal
Trials, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 608 (1975).
143. But occasionally an approach rejecting any balancing and urging absolute protection of
both rights is suggested. See. e.g., Wright, Fair Trial-Free Press, 38 F.R.D. 435 (1965). And
Justice Brennan, concurring in Nebraska Press Ass'n, urged a rule of absolute protection of the
press from prior restraints. 427 U.S. at 585-604 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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largely meaningless anachronism. Criticism of current doctrine, which
itself arises from the same assumptions about the ultimate concern of
the provision, will continue to be ineffective in light of the realities of
the twentieth century. Only by abandoning the focus on firearms themselves and shifting attention to the true ends of the second amendment-personal security-will proper understanding of the second
amendment develop so that it becomes a useful tool in maintaining the
fundamental structure of rights and powers set forth in the
Constitution.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

An examination of the second amendment concerns of the Framers
of the second amendment indicates that firearms were not intended to
be ends in themselves, but rather means by which citizens would assure
themselves of a right of security. This right has a number of aspects:
security against foreign invasion, security against government oppression at the federal and state levels, and security against criminal acts of
other individuals. It seems clear that at least some of the Framers
thought that individual ownership of weapons was essential to secure
these ends. In light of historical developments that seriously alter the
relationship between the means of firearms and the end of personal security, however, the ends sought by the second amendment should take
precedence.
The traditional view that the second amendment does not apply to
the states is justified. When a state legislature, acting through proper
representative procedures, decides to limit or even to prohibit the individual possession of firearms, it attempts to maximize the citizens' right
to security against invasion, government oppression and crime, not to
interfere with it. In light of the fact that individual firearms play almost no role today in providing security against foreign invasion and
government oppression, and the fact that a plausible argument exists
that banning firearms will have the overall effect of increasing the people's security against crime, state firearms legislation is consistent with
the concerns underlying the second amendment. This is true regardless
of the type of legislation involved, from registration to outright
prohibition.
The traditional view that the second amendment limits federal legislation only to the extent that legislation seeks to disarm organized
state militias should be modified. The amendment envisions that state
and local communities are the basic units for deciding the most appropriate way to preserve the right of security. Constitutional provisions
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safeguard against government oppression and provide for national security so that private firearms are not necessary. However, the question
of the efficacy of private firearms as a means of providing security
against crime remains unsettled. States are likely to differ on this question not only as a result of differing political philosophies, but also due
to real differences in the social conditions of the states and the resulting
likelihood that free access to weapons either will increase or reduce the
security of the individual citizen against crime. Courts should respect
state decisions on this matter, as long as those decisions are consistent
with the mandate of the second amendment.
This does not mean that the federal government may do nothing at
all related to firearms, however. Registration of firearms or permissive
licensing of firearms owners will not interfere with the ability of those
citizens to provide for their security against crime, and therefore will
not interfere with any state's decision to permit private firearms ownership. Likewise, even restrictive licensing or outright prohibition will
pose no constitutional problem when limited to weapons that are inappropriate for self-defense. But the second amendment should bar any
federal attempt to prohibit ownership of weapons appropriate for selfdefense to persons the states permit to own such weapons. To this extent, the second amendment should protect individuals, as well as state
militias, from federal interference.
The second amendment is not the sole constitutional provision governing the validity of firearms legislation. Such legislation also must
conform to other constitutional provisions, including the equal protection and due process clauses. State and local legislation, of course, must
conform with state constitutional guarantees. Keeping in mind that the
basic purpose of the second amendment is to assure citizens a right of
security against several types of threats, it is possible to delineate the
scope and effect of the amendment to avoid disregarding and belittling
the provision.
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